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THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants
federal and state governments the authority to take private property for a
public use provided just compensation is paid. I Courts in the United
States have long understood the Fifth Amendment to mean that a
governmental taking must satisfy a public use in order to constitute a
legitimate exercise of eminent domain. 2 Traditionally, this power, com-
monly referred to as eminent domain, 3 had come to mean the taking of
property only when it was actually used by the public. 4 Such uses were
limited to public parks, roads, sewer systems, hospitals, and other similar
developments to which the public had actual physical access. 5 Today,
however, this constitutional public use limitation is generally not a chal-
lenging obstacle, for most takings are declared by the courts to be for a
public use.6
The public use limitation has reached its widest parameters through
broad statutory and case law, such that it now includes economic develop-
ment. 7 The effect of this expansive public use allowance provides the
private sector with a legal means of obtaining property for economic
development. 8 Statutory law has declared specific uses to be public
under conditions which previous law had prohibited. 9 Therefore, public
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation"). The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution applies to states through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. See, e.g., Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
2. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CoRELL L. REV. 61,61 (1986); see
generally 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN (Julius L. Sackman ed., 3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter 2A
NICHOLS]. This treatise is a major reference source regarding the law of eminent domain. See
JACQUES B. GERLIN & DAVID W. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN I n. I (Michie Co. Law
Publishers 1982).
3. See I NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1. 12[1] (Julius L. Sackman ed., 3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter
1 NICHOLS]. The term "eminent domain" likely originated in 1625, when Hugo Grotius wrote in DE
JURE BELLI ET PACIS that "the property of subjects is under the eminent domain of the state, so that
the state or he who acts for it may use and even alienate and destroy such property. . . in which even
private persons have a right over the property of others, but for the ends of public utility .. ..'" Id.
4. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.01[1].
5. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[2].
6. See Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE
L.J. 599, 608 (1949).
7. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. 1981)
(upholding the city of Detroit's use of eminent domain power to take private property and turn it over
to General Motors Corporation for the construction of an automobile assembly plant).
8. See City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 369 (N.D. 1996)
(stating that economic development is recognized as a public use).
9. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[10][b].
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use definitions require only that the public benefit from the use, rather
than requiring, as they once did, that the public have actual physical
access to the use. 10
Additionally, the meaning of public use has been interpreted broad-
ly by the courts, such that virtually any acquisition meets the criteria of
serving the public interest or contributing to a public purpose."l The
public use limitation is thus generally meaningless in light of recent
national decisions upholding takings of property that courts likely would
have found impermissible in the past.12 Consequently, this expansive
interpretation of the public use doctrine results in the use of eminent
domain in instances in which a private interest, rather than a public
entity, is asserted to be acting for the benefit of the community.13
Thus, statutory law has broadened public use interpretation,1 4 while
case law has broadened the public use doctrine. 15 This Note will consid-
er the effect of both. It will illustrate the extent to which the public use
doctrine has evolved with particular regard to economic development.16
It will then examine the courts' treatment of the contemporary public
use doctrine and attempt to provide suggestions as to how courts might
choose to review a private transferee taking.' 7 It will also discuss how the
economic influence on the public use doctrine stands to affect the institu-
tion of private property concerning future government condemnation. 18
Part II of this Note will explain what constitutes a public use in
contemporary American law.19 Part III will explore the historical
development of the economic application of the public use doctrine, 20
while Part IV will examine the judicial review following a finding of
10. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[10][b].
11. See David Schultz & David Jann, The Use of Eminent Domain and Contractually Implied
Property Rights to Affect Business and Plant Closings, 16 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 383, 387-88 (1990).
12. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 61 (stating that most observers think the public use limitation on
the power of eminent domain is a dead letter).
13. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)
(upholding the condemnation of appellant's property for the construction of a General Motors
assembly plant).
14. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[10][b] (noting that states are able to declare particular
uses to be public for the purposes of eminent domain).
15. See generally Schultz & Jann, supra note 11 (discussing the effect of the Poletown decision).
16. See id. (defining the expansive modern use of eminent domain).
17. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[l l][a] (stating that the determination of a public use is
for the legislature).
18. See Thomas Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities by the Power of Eminent Domain, 51
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 355, 378 (1983) (arguing that the use of the contemporary public use doctrine
threatens private property).
19. See 2A N ICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[3][a] (stating that public use generally means public
advantage).
20. See generally Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Eminent Domain, "Public Use," and the Conundrum of
Original Intent, 36 NRJ 59 (1996) (providing a general history of the public use doctrine).
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public use.21 Part V will focus with detail on North Dakota's public use
doctrine and explain the judicial treatment of the law within the state.22
Finally, Parts VI and VII will explore the future of the law of eminent
domain .23
II. EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC USE
It is widely recognized that the meaning of the phrase "public
use," when used with regard to the authority of eminent domain, is not
an exact and sweeping definition of universal application. 24 Rather, pub-
lic use can mean a great many different things to any number of
jurisdictions. 25 Furthermore, a number of factors, including local and
particular circumstances, affect the meaning of the public use doctrine,
making it more difficult to understand and predict.26
A. DEFINITION OF PUBLIC USE
The public use doctrine is defined as either "use by the public" or
"use for public advantage." 27 The former interpretation includes any
actual use by the public or opportunity for use by the public. 28 The
latter details any use which tends to enlarge resources, increase industrial
energies, or promote the productive power of any considerable number
of habitants of a community. 29 An explanation of both meanings is
important in the development of eminent domain, because both play a
part in the conflict between the two basic views of public use: the broad,
"advantage-to-the-public" view and the narrow, "use-by-the-public"
view. 30 As discussed below, courts have virtually abandoned the narrow,
use-by-the-public application because it requires that the public directly
benefit from the proposed condemnation. 3 1
21. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[1 l][b] (stating that once a use is declared public by the
legislature, the general rule for courts is to defer to the eminent domain exercising authority).
22. See generally City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 369 (N.D.
1996) (finding that economic development is recognized as a valid public use within North Dakota).
23. See Ross, supra note 18, at 369-70 (arguing that improper motivation, the threat to private
property, and the lack of accountability to the public are all probable effects of the modem public use
doctrine).
24. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[1].
25. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[1] n.3 (indicating that public use has been recognized
as an impracticability in many jurisdictions).
26. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[3][a].
27. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.0 2 [2]-[3][a].
28. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[2].
29. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[3].
30. See Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203,
205-06 (1978) (discussing the basic meaning of the two main public use views).
31. See id. at 205 (stating that, to date, the broad, advantage-to-the-public view is favored by
courts interpreting "public use").
1999] 785
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However, in 1967, in Burger v. City of Beatrice,32 the Nebraska
Supreme Court did apply the narrow public use approach in an attempt
to protect individual property rights. 33 The plaintiff landowners in
Burger sought to enjoin the city of Beatrice from removing the ground-
water from beneath the surface of their lands through eminent domain
proceedings. 34 The Burger court held that the taking was void because it
was for the private benefit of private companies engaged in the produc-
tion of commercial fertilizers. 35 The fact that condemnation would
result in increased employment and business was of no concern to the
court. 36 Rather the court stated that such an indirect public benefit
would not constitute a public use for the purposes of eminent domain. 37
Burger clearly was an instance in which the court applied a narrow
public use application. 38
The problem in eminent domain litigation, however, rarely concerns
this narrower approach, because state legislatures are able to define
statutorily what constitutes a public use. 39 These often broad determina-
tions establish what projects or economic development will constitute
public use for the purpose of eminent domain.40 Thus, for instance, state
legislatures are able to declare such projects as urban development to be
public uses.41
The complications concerning eminent domain arise when private
property is taken by the government and transferred to a private interest
in the name of a public use.42 In Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit,43 for instance, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the
city of Detroit's plan to condemn and remove an entire city
neighborhood for the construction of a General Motors assembly
plant.44 The city had authority for such an awesome project pursuant to
32. 147 N.W.2d 784 (Neb. 1967).
33. See Burger v. City of Beatrice, 147 N.W.2d 784, 791 (Neb. 1967).
34. See id. at 787.
35. See id. at 788.
36. See id. at 791. However, had the condemnation been for the purpose of furnishing drinking
water to the city's inhabitants, the court would have upheld the eminent domain proceedings as a valid
public use. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id. The court stated that had it upheld the taking as a valid public use, there would be no
limit to the exercise of eminent domain for the benefit of the private enterprise. Id.
39. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981)
(quoting Gregory Marina, Inc. v. Detroit, 144 N.W.2d 503, 516 (Mich. 1966)).
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 457.
43. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
44. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. 1981). City
officials had to acquire nearly 1,700 parcels of property, relocate more than 3,500 residents, demolish
1,500 residential and commercial structures, and complete the site in less than 18 months. Id. at 464.
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the Michigan Economic Development Corporations Act. 45 At issue was
whether the city's use of eminent domain was a constitutional
condemnation 46 for public use. 47 The court declared it was a public use
taking, making it constitutionally permissible.4 8
The Poletown court began by abandoning the narrow public use
application. 49 Instead, it used the expanded, "use-for-public-advan-
tage" approach,50 on the grounds that the social and economic benefit
to the city was of paramount importance. 5 1 The Poletown court looked
particularly at the purported public benefits of the General Motors
assembly plant.52 In doing so, the court declared that the power of
eminent domain should be used to accomplish the essential public
purposes of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic
base of the community. 53 Thus, because this proposal met those criteria,
the court found that the public benefit was served.54
Following the Poletown decision, the public use limitation expanded
throughout the country.55 Suddenly, the use-for-the-public-benefit view
provided authorization for condemnation of private property for eco-
45. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.1601-.1613 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
There exists in this state the continuing need for programs to alleviate and prevent
conditions of unemployment, and the legislature finds that it is accordingly necessary to
assist and retain local industrial and commercial enterprises, including employee-owned
corporations, to strengthen and revitalize the economy of this state and its municipalities;
that accordingly it is necessary to provide means and methods for the encouragement
and assistance of industrial and commercial enterprises, including employee-owned
corporations, in locating, purchasing, constructing, reconstructing, modernizing,
improving, maintaining, repairing, furnishing, equipping, and expanding in this state and
in its municipalities ....
Id. § 125.1602.
46. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 292 (6th ed. 1990). "Condemnation" refers to the process of
taking private property for the public use through the power of eminent domain. Id. To "condemn"
refers to the expropriation of property for public use through the exercise of the power of eminent
domain. Id.
47. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457.
48. Id. at 460.
49. Id. at 457 (stating that the term "public use" has not received a narrow definition).
50. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[3][a]. "Use for the public advantage" refers to any
use which tends to enlarge resources, increase industrial energies, provide employment, or promote
productive power for a population of a community. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[3].
51. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459 (justifying the need for the project based on the city's
evidence of severe economic conditions).
52. Id. at 459. The estimate was that approximately 6,150 people would be employed by the
factory itself, with the generation of substantial other employment, business activity, and tax revenue
as an end result. Id. at 464 n.15. However, the project plan also indicated that a total of 3,438 people
would be displaced by the project, that it would require the destruction of 1,176 structures, and that the
cost of the project to the public sector would be nearly $200 million. Id.
53. Id. at 459. The city of Detroit provided substantial evidence of severe economic conditions
facing the citizens of the city and state, the need for new industrial development to revitalize local
industries, and the economic boost the construction project would provide. Id.
54. Id. at 460.
55. See Schultz & Jann, supra note 11, at 394 (stating that prior to Poletown, public use could only
be met by traditional public necessities).
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nomic development, despite any incidental private gains bestowed upon
a private entity.5 6 The Poletown decision made certain a previously
unknown flexibility of the broad public use definition. 57
The Poletown court thereby provided for a great deal of change
within public use law.5 8 It held that whether a use is public would be
determined in light of changing conditions in society.5 9 This concept is
important, because it permits a court a great deal of flexibility in deter-
mining what exactly constitutes a public use from one year to the next
and from one city to the next. 60 Put simply, it is likely that a public use
will apply differently to different locations, circumstances, and needs
throughout the country. 61 Thus, what may constitute a public use in one
jurisdiction may be determined to be a private use in another juris-
diction. 62 Such a result gives rise to ambiguities concerning the interpre-
tations of public use. 63 However, it must be recognized that courts do
not only apply the narrow, use-by-the-public interpretation; rather, they
are also willing to tolerate the broad, use-for-public-advantage applica-
tion of the eminent domain doctrine. 64
B. FACTORS AFFECTING THE MEANING OF PUBLIC USE
There are several factors courts generally must consider that affect
the application of eminent domain condemnation law and help to clarify
the meaning of "public use." 65 First, the condemnation or taking must
affect a portion of a community, as distinguished from only one indi-
56. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 458.
57. See Schultz & Jann, supra note 11, at 394 (arguing that general economic prosperity replaces
traditional public purposes and creates flexibility in the law of eminent domain).
58. See Schultz & Jann, supra note I1, at 394.
59. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457.
60. See id.
61. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[1].
62. See generally Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 88 P. 426 (Idaho 1906); Boyd v. Ritter Lum-
ber Co., 89 S.E. 273 (Va. 1916). In a state where the lumber industry is considered essential to the
state economy, the use of eminent domain has been held to be proper in support of the public use fac-
tor. See Potlatch, 88 P. at 432. However, in other jurisdictions where lumber is not an essential factor
of the state economy, the use of eminent domain in support of that industry has been held to be a
private use and not a public use. See Boyd, 89 SE. at 279.
63. See Boyd, 89 SE. at 279.
64. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal. 1982). When the Oakland
Raiders football team failed to reach a settlement agreement on an option to renew a lease, it
announced its intentions to move to Los Angeles. Id. To prohibit this move, the city of Oakland
attempted to use its eminent domain power to acquire all property rights associated with the Oakland
Raiders football team. Id. Although the court remanded the case on the public use issue, it did decide
that such a taking of the contract rights of a football team for a transfer to a private party did not
preclude use of eminent domain. Id. at 843. Further, the court stated that California eminent domain
law was "intended to provide the broadest possible definition of property and to include any type of
right, title or interest in property that may be required for public use." Id. at 838-39.
65. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[3][a].
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vidual. 66 Second, the use to which the condemned property is applied
must be one generally authorized by law. 67 Finally, a governmental con-
demnation transferred to a private interest must bestow some public bene-
fit to the community at large.68 Thus, a private party may not employ
public use condemnation to acquire private property to be used and
controlled as private property for the sole interest of the private entity.69
The first factor, which mandates that the public use taking affect a
portion of the population, is contingent on the numbers of people
participating in, or benefiting from, the purported public use.70 There is
no formula or calculation for such a determination, and courts do not
use a specific number or a fraction of the community in making this
determination. 71 However, it is certain that most courts consider it un-
necessary that the entire community or even a considerable portion of it
enjoys the public benefit. 72
In fact, it is generally enough that the benefit to the public be an
indirect one, whereby the community shares in some large, generalized
benefit.73 In Poletown, for instance, the benefits consisted of a decrease
in unemployment, an increase in tax base, and a revitalization of local
industries. 74 Therefore, if the public use is analogous to the public
advantage, it is enough that the people of a specific locality receive the
benefit. 75
The second factor affecting the meaning of public use requires the
purpose of the condemnation to be authorized by law.76 State statutes
and constitutions primarily provide for this requirement, 77 and therefore
66. See 2A NIcHoLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[3][a].
67. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.0213][a].
68. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.0213][a].
69. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[3][a].
70. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[4].
71. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[4] (stating that it is not the number of people, per se,
who benefit in the use which determines whether or not it should be deemed public).
72. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[4]; see also Austin Enterprises, Inc. v. DeKalb County,
149 S.E.2d 461, 463 (Ga. 1966) (holding that the test for a public use is not the number of people who
use it, but rather that all have an occasion to use it); State Highway Comm'n v. Thomton, 156 S.E.2d
248, 260 (N.C. 1967) (stating that a road is a public use despite how many people actually use it);
Tracey v. Peterson, 181 N.E.2d 479, 482 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960) (stating that if a road is open to the
public, the question of the number of persons who will use it is immaterial).
73. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Mich. 1981)
(stating that programs to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment and to preserve and
develop industry and commerce are to be declared by the legislature essential public purposes).
74. Id. at 459 (stating that the project would provide Detroit with an economic boost).
75. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[4].
76. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[3][a].
77. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 17; ARK.
CONST. art. 2, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19; COLO. CONsT. art. 2, §§ 14 & 15; CON'. CONST. art. 1, § I1;
DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 6; GA. CONST. art. 4, § 2; HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 20; IDAHO
CONST. art. 1, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 15; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 21; IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 18; KAN.
CONsT. art. 12, § 4; Ky. CoNsT. § 13; LA. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2 & 4; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 21; MD. CONSr.
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it is generally not a problem for either the authority exercising eminent
domain or the courts. 78 Furthermore, several state statutes and state
constitutions have declared some specific uses to be public. 79
In Poletown, the authority for the condemnation of the appellant's
property for the construction of the General Motors assembly plant was
provided by both the Michigan state constitution8O and Michigan statuto-
ry law. 81 While such statutes are binding upon the state courts, however,
they cannot supersede the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits states from taking
private property for private purposes without the property owner's
consent. 82 Thus, if a state statute did authorize a particular taking for an
impermissible private use, it could eventually be overturned on constitu-
tional grounds by the United States Supreme Court or the particular
state's highest court.83
The final factor to be considered maintains that the public receive
some public benefit as a result of the private holding.84 This final factor
concerns much of what was discussed in the first factor. 85 More impor-
tantly, however, courts will determine whether the proposed taking is for
the primary benefit of the public interest or the private interest. 86 Courts
often will examine the benefits bestowed upon the private party as a
result of a public use taking. 87 However, they will not find that the
taking is invalid merely because of an incidental benefit to a private
art. 3, §§ 40 & 40A; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 10, § 11; MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. 1, §
13; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 17; MO. CONST. art. 1, §§ 26, 27, & 28; MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 29; NEB. CONST.
art. 1, § 21; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 12; N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 20; N.M. CONST. art.
2, § 20; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 7; N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 19, N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 16; OHIO CONST. art. 1, §
19; OKLA. CONST. art. 2 §§ 23 & 24; OR. CONST. art. I, § 18; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10; R.I. CONST. art. 1, §
16; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 13; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 13; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 21; TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 17;
UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 22; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 2; VA. CONST. art. 1, §§ 6 & 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, §
16; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 9; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 13; Wy. CONST. art. 1, §§ 32 & 33.
78. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-58-02(2)-(3) (Supp. 1999) (declaring that eminent domain
may be used for developmental programs which eliminate unemployment, underemployment, and job-
lessness for the benefit of the state economy).
79. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[10][b]; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.1602 (West 1997
& Supp. 1999) (declaring as public purposes the need for programs which alleviate unemployment and
assist and retain local industries).
80. See MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2. "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law." Id.
81. See supra note 45 (quoting Michigan Economic Development Corporations Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 125.1602).
82. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.01[5][b]; see also U.S. CONST. amend V (indicating "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation").
83. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.01 [5][b].
84. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[3][a].
85. The numbers of people participating in or benefiting from the purported public use is of
concern to the court when determining if the specific use actually benefits the community. See 2A
NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[4].
86. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Mich. 1981).
87. See id. The plaintiff, the Poletown neighborhood council, argued that "conveyance to




interest. 88 In Poletown, for example, the Michigan Supreme Court held
that any benefit to General Motors was merely incidental in light of the
essential public purposes of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing
the economic base of the economy. 89 Yet, because it is likely that there
will be benefits to both the private interest and the public community,
courts often will look to the primary goal of the proposed taking.90
It is true that eminent domain may not be used solely to aid private
individuals to carry on their businesses, but eminent domain may be
used to help a private interest if the primary goal of the taking leads to a
scheme that will eventually promote the public welfare or advantage. 9 1
However, the requirement that a benefit be bestowed upon the public is
only one factor affecting the application of the public use doctrine. The
additional factors concerning the numbers benefiting from the condem-
nation and the requirement maintaining that the condemnation be
authorized by law are matters that courts will almost certainly scrutinize
as well.92 However, whatever a court examines, its decision will be
predicated on the historical application of the public use doctrine.93
III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE
APPLICATION
The right of the sovereign to take property for public use without
the owner's consent has been exercised since the days of the Romans. 94
In the United States, however, the concept of eminent domain was not
known at common law. 95 It was not until Kohl v. United States,9 6 nearly
a century after the drafting of the Fifth Amendment, that the Supreme
Court first decided a federal public use taking case. 97 Eminent domain,
88. See id.
89. Id. at 459.
90. See id.
91. See City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 372 (N.D. 1996)
(quoting 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.07[l]).
92. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[3][a].
93. See generally Berger, supra note 30 (discussing the historical public use application).
94. See I NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.12[l]. However, it was recognized by an early nineteenth
century French jurist, Merlin de Douai, that the Bible alludes to the earliest known exercise of the
power of eminent domain, contained in the story of the acquisition of Naboth's vineyard by King Ahab
upon the instigation of Jezebel, who caused Naboth to be stoned to death because of his refusal to sell
land. See 1 NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.2[l] (citing to I Kings XXI of the Bible).
95. See I NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.12[2]. Several original state constitutions recognized the
sovereign power to take property for the public use, but the phrase "eminent domain" is not used in
any of them. See I NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1. 12[2].
96. 91 U.S. 367 (1876).
97. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876); Melton, supra note 20, at 67. The federal
government did not exercise its own eminent domain powers until late in the 1800s. Melton, supra note
20, at 67; see also Kohl, 91 U.S. at 367-68, 372 (validating the use of the federal power of eminent
domain for the construction of a post office in Cincinnati, Ohio, and holding that the right of eminent
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however, now has a broader application than the prior understanding of
its meaning. 98 Presently, the phrase "eminent domain" is not merely a
legal term of law, it is rather a traditional concept familiar to most
community members.99
A. EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PUBLIC USE
DOCTRINE
In the early nineteenth century, uses for eminent domain were
becoming increasingly significant.lOO Railroads, generally privately
owned, were given the power of eminent domain in order to operate and
expand.101 For courts to rule otherwise would have meant that railroads
would not have existed, because they needed the power to obtain the
land required for their tracks.102 As governmental activity expanded,
concepts such as "public good," "public necessity," and "public
utility" came, in some jurisdictions, to have expansive meanings.103 This
was particularly true where states had a strong desire to encourage
exploitation of natural wealth and to increase industrial development. 104
Courts, however, feeling the full implications of their role as guardians of
property rights, began to see a threat in the definition of public use that
was so broad that any purpose might be held to justify a taking. 105 In
domain was adopted and employed by the United States Constitution to obtain lands.for public uses).
The federal government's failure to exercise its eminent domain powers until the late 1800s meant that
the Fifth Amendment provision, "private property shall not be taken for public use," was a not a large
influence in eminent domain law in the early years of the country. Melton, supra note 20, at 68. The
colonies and states had analogous provisions in their early laws and constitutions. Melton, supra note
20, at 68. Such provisions provided a source for James Madison as he drafted what became the Fifth
Amendment in 1789. Melton, supra note 20, at 68. Yet, much of what concerns eminent domain law
proceeded not from the constitutions and statutes, but rather from common law principles. Melton,
supra note 20, at 68.
98. See I NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.12[2]. Eminent domain is "the rightful authority, which
exists in every sovereignty, to control and regulate those rights of a public nature which pertain to its
citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the
public safety, necessity, convenience or welfare may demand." I NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.12[2].
99. See I NICHOLS, supra note 3, § 1.12[2].
100. See Berger, supra note 30, at 208.
101. See Berger, supra note 30, at 208.
102. See Berger, supra note 30, at 208. Railroads would not have existed if courts had held strict-
ly that no property could be taken for a private industry, because the privately owned railroads
inevitably benefited financially from such a use. See generally Berger, supra note 30, at 208.
103. See Comment, supra note 6, at 601.
[I]t is enough if the taking tends to enlarge resources, increase the industrial energies
and promote the productive power of any considerable part of the inhabitants of a
section of the state, or leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new channels for
the employment of private capital and labor, as such results indirectly contribute to the
general prosperity of the whole community.
Comment, supra note 6, at 601 (quoting Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 88 P. 426, 431 (Idaho 1906)).
104. See Comment, supra note 6, at 601.
105. See Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L.
REv. 615, 618 (1940).
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view of this threat, courts applied the narrow view that public use meant
exactly what it stated-actual use or right to use. 106
Although the narrow view held substantial support among most
jurisdictions in the mid-nineteenth century, it never captured exclusive
control throughout the country.107 While courts generally continued to
apply the narrow definition following the early industrialization of
America,108 a number of minority positions still insisted that, in the law
of eminent domain, public use might mean public benefit.109 More
important, however, were the exceptions that courts applying the majori-
ty view were being forced to endorse. 110 In order to avoid bringing the
two views into conflict at a time when industrialism and quick exploita-
tion of natural resources were deemed necessary, the majority view sup-
ported limitations and evasions to the narrow, right-to-use application."'l
The Mills Acts 1 2 presented an opportunity for the courts to make
an exception to the narrow public use doctrine.113 Generally, these acts
authorized downstream lower riparian land owners 114 to construct and
maintain mills on the condition that upstream riparian land owners
would be able to recover damages for any flooding caused by the mills'
106. See Berger, supra note 30, at 208.
107. See Nichols, supra note 105, at 618.
108. See Nichols, supra note 105, at 618. The narrow view refers to an actual use, or right to
use, of the condemned property by the public. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2 § 7.02[2]. In early
industrial America, great enterprises began to emerge with substantial capital. See Nichols, supra note
105, at 618. Thus, the courts feared that legislatures' conception of public advantage might lead them
to authorize and support wholesale expropriation of farms and homes. Nichols, supra note 105, at 618.
109. See Nichols, supra note 105, at 619. "Public benefit" refers to eminent domain action which
generally enlarges resources, increases industrial energies, or promotes the productive power of a
community. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.02[3][a]; see also Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 88
P. 426, 431 (Idaho 1906) (discussing the public use doctrine as anything which tends to enlarge
resources).
110. See Nichols, supra note 105, at 619.
111. See Nichols, supra note 105, at 619.
112. See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1884) (providing a complete list of the
Mills Acts through 1884). General Mills Acts existed in a majority of the states. Id at 16. They were
enacted in Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, North Carolina, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island before the Declaration of Independence. Id. Mills Acts were also enacted in Maine,
Kentucky, Missouri, and Arkansas following their admission into the union. Id. Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida enacted Mills
Acts while they were territories and then reenacted them after becoming states. Id. Mills Acts were
also enacted in Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Vermont, Kansas, Oregon, West Virginia, and Georgia.
Id. at 17.
113. See id. (discussing much of the history of the Mills Acts).
114. A riparian land owner is one who owns land on the bank of a river, or one who is the owner
of land along or adjacent to and in contact with a river. See BLACK'S LAW DicnONARY 922 (6th ed.
1990).
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operation."l 5 The result, then, was that the lower riparian land owner had
rights to take the property of the upper riparian land owner.116
Initially, most courts upheld the statutes concerning mills operated
for private enterprise on the grounds that great benefit to the public
would result from their operation."l 7 Yet, other courts continued to
employ the narrow, right-to-use-by-the-public application."l 8 Eventual-
ly, as industrialism progressed, the significance of the Mills Acts declined
with the disappearance of water power and the emergence of hydroelec-
tric power. 119 However, the courts' support of the Mills Acts statutes
suggested that promotion of privately owned mills was important to local
economies. 120
It is generally understood that two important concepts arose from
the history of the Mills Acts. 121 First, there was a foremost acceptance of
the broad view of what constituted a public use.122 Second, the Mills
Acts presented an exception to the narrow doctrine that only condemna-
tions essential for exploitation of natural resources vital to the local
welfare may be for a public use. 123 While there is argument over wheth-
er the Mills Acts constituted a public benefit, it does appear certain that
the takings were in the interests of a private entity.124
In the face of industrialism and the increased need for power, such
as that from the mills, courts were fearful that public use might permit
unlimited invasions into the rights of private property owners. 12 5 The
effect of this concern was the application of the narrow, right-to-use view
115. See Head, 113 U.S. at 17. In the late 18th century, the mills were grist mills generally re-
quired to be open to the public for the grinding of corn. Id. By the 19th century, the mills had come to
be used as supply power for saw, paper, and cotton mills, in addition to other manufacturing industries.
Id. In these latter cases, the mills were often just for the use and benefit of their owners. Id.
116. See Berger, supra note 30, at 206.
117. See Berger, supra note 30, at 206; see also Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman 23 Am.
Dec. 622 (Mass. 1832). The Boston & Roxbury Mill court held that use by the public was not the
proper test and that it was expected that so many citizens would have an opportunity of means of
employment that the public received a direct benefit. Boston & Roxbury Mill, 23 Am. Dec. at 622.
118. See Berger, supra note 30, at 206 (citing Gaylor v. Sanitary Dist., 68 N.E. 522, 524-26 (II1.
1903)).
119. See Berger, supra note 30, at 206. Hydroelectric power is produced by public utilities, and
such utilities' right to take property is without question, because it directly benefits the entire public.
Berger, supra note 30, at 206.
120. See Melton, supra note 20, at 75.
121. See generally Berger, supra note 30, at 206 (noting the significance of the early acceptance
of the Mills Acts); Nichols, supra note 105, at 623-24 (recognizing an exception to the Mills Acts).
122. See Berger, supra note 30, at 206 (stating that it was the great benefit to the public which
justified the taking despite the fact that a private individual received a substantial and perhaps greater
benefit).
123. See Nichols, supra note 105, at 623-24 (discussing the universal recognition that mining,
agriculture, and the needs of industry are all exceptions to the use by the public doctrine).
124. See Comment, supra note 6, at 605 (stating that the Mills Acts presented a clear instance of
a private taking).
125. See Berger, supra note 30, at 208.
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through much of the nineteenth century.126 Yet, in the case of certain
public utilities for which public access was not always appropriate, it was
sufficient if the public could use the product of the facility.127 Thus, the
result of industrialism was confusion over the rule with respect to public
use. 128
B. THE TREND TOWARD THE CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE
Throughout the beginning of the twentieth century, exceptions for
exploitation of natural resources continued to be recognized as a legiti-
mate departure from the narrow interpretation of the public use
doctrine. 129 Nonetheless, there was a slow trend within the law of emi-
nent domain to expand the meaning of the public use. 130 In effect, the
public use doctrine became ambiguous, and predicting results often was
difficult.131
It was not until 1954, in the United States Supreme Court case
Berman v. Parker,132 that the contemporary expanded public use doc-
trine was first pronounced. 133 The Berman Court held constitutional
Washington, D.C.'s use of eminent domain to acquire commercial
property for an urban renewal project. 134 The authority for the renewal
project was exercised pursuant to the District of Columbia Redevelop-
ment Act of 1945.135 In Berman, landowners argued that the taking of
their land was unconstitutional because it was not slum housing136 and
126. See Berger, supra note 30, at 208.
127. See Berger, supra note 30, at 208-09. Facilities such as power plants were such places
where public assess was inappropriate. Berger, supra note 30, at 208.
128. See Berger, supra note 30, at 208 (stating that commentators in the latter half of the 19th
century were in hopeless confusion as to what was the "true rule").
129. See Nichols, supra note 105, at 623-24.
130. See generally Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 88 P. 426 (Idaho 1906); Vetter v. Broad-
hurst, 60 NW. 109 (Neb. 1916); New York Hous. Auth. v. Muller, I N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936) (holding
that condemnation for housing and slum clearance was for a public use and purpose).
131. See Berger, supra note 30, at 209 (illustrating the confusion surrounding the public use
doctrine in the early 20th century).
132. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
133. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (stating that the term "public welfare" is broad
and inclusive).
134. Id. at 26, 36.
135. Id. at 28.
By § 2 of the Act, Congress made a 'legislative determination' that 'owing to
technological and sociological changes, obsolete lay-out, and other factors, conditions
existing in the District of Columbia with respect to substandard housing and blighted
areas, including the use of buildings in alleys as dwellings for human habitation, are
injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare; and it is hereby declared to be
the policy of the United States to protect and promote the welfare of the inhabitants of
the seat of the government by eliminating all such injurious conditions by employing all
means necessary and appropriate for the purpose.
Id.
136. Courts have consistently held that the removal of slum areas is a valid public purpose
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because it was to be redeveloped for private, rather than public, use. 137
The Court disagreed, stating that issues concerning public welfare were
to be construed as broad and inclusive. 138 Moreover, the Court went on
to state that the power of eminent domain was merely a means to an
end.139 For instance, once the objective for which the power of eminent
domain was to be exercised was within the authority of Congress, the
means by which property would be attained for that objective was for
Congress to determine. 140 Here, one of the means chosen was the use of
private enterprise for redevelopment of an area.141
The Supreme Court's decision in Berman was quite remarkable in
1954,142 and it has become established as a modem authority for an
expansive public use doctrine. 143 However, much of what surrounds the
dispute over public use today concerns not the designed clearance of
slum areas but rather the taking of property for economic growth.144
The taking in Poletown illustrates best the use of eminent domain
for economic development.145 In Poletown, the Michigan Supreme
Court declared that the city of Detroit's use of eminent domain to take
and remove a city neighborhood, which was not a slum area, in order to
provide for the construction of a General Motors assembly plant was
constitutional. 146 The Poletown court conceded that the taking did
benefit a private industry.147 Yet, it was the additional societal benefits,
including the alleviation of severe economic conditions in the city, the
revitalization of local industries through new industrial development, and
because such areas are generally disease infested and are breeding grounds for crime. See 2A
NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.06[23][a]. Therefore, slums are cleared either simply to remove them or to
provide low-income housing. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.06[23][d]. A failure of a housing project
to call for the removal of slums does not render the taking invalid. 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, §
7.06[23][d]. Rather, eminent domain may be used for the taking of any lands deemed necessary for a
housing project regardless of the fact that a few isolated properties are outside the slum area. 2A
NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.06[23][d].
137. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 31. In Berman, a department store had been located on the proper-
ty in dispute. Id. However, the fact that the department store was not a slum area did not invalidate
the taking, because the Court determined that a redevelopment project could be applied to blighted
areas that produce slums. Id. at 35. The Court further stated that such redevelopment projects need
not be on a lot-by-lot basis, but rather whole areas could be declared as part of the redevelopment
project. Id.
138. Id. at 33.
139. Id.
140. Id. (stating that it was for those who govern the District of Columbia to decide that the
nation's capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary).
141. Id.
142. See Schultz & Jann, supra note I1, at 388.
143. To date, Berman has been cited in nearly 700 state and federal cases as a major authority
regarding eminent domain. See Westlaw Keycite (348 U.S. 26), Feb. 25, 1999.
144. See generally Schultz & Jann, supra note II (discussing the modem use of eminent domain).
145. See supra notes 43-55 (discussing the public use doctrine in the Poletown decision).
146. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 460 (Mich. 1981)
(holding that the project was warranted on the basis that it was significant for the people of Detroit).
147. Id. at 459 (stating that such a project was an intended and legitimate object of the legislature
when it allowed municipalities to exercise condemnation powers even though, ultimately, a private
party would also receive a benefit).
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the general economic boost that the project would produce, that proved
to be of paramount importance in deciding that the project was a public
use.148
This decision provoked tremendous protest both in the court-
room149 and the city.150 Justices Fitzgerald and Ryan both wrote dissent-
ing opinions that strongly opposed the condemnation as going beyond
the scope of eminent domain. 151 In a lengthy and vigorous dissent, Jus-
tice Ryan found the "slum clearance" authority to be unsupportive of
General Motors' position. 152 He noted that the objective of eminent do-
main when used in connection with slum clearance is not to convey land
to a private corporation, but to eliminate blight, danger, and disease.153
Justice Ryan further argued that commerce takings generally con-
tained three common characteristics that justified their approval by the
court: extreme public necessity, continuing accountability to the public,
and land selection based on facts of independent public significance. 154
Justice Ryan found that the taking of land for the use of a General
Motors assembly plant lacked all three elements. 155 First, a new General
Motors assembly plant was not of such public necessity that eminent
domain should be exercised. 156 Second, no continuing accountability to
the public was present, because the public had no equal and fair access to
the General Motors plant.' 5 7 Furthermore, there was to be no public
control over the operation or conduct of the plant after it was sold to
General Motors.158 Finally, the land was not chosen for any independent
public significance; rather, the location was a result of conditions laid
148. Id.
149. Id. at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
150. See Jack Anderson, What's Good for GM Not Good for Town, WASH. P osT, Apr. 4, 1981, at
E47; William Safire, Poletown Wrecker's Ball, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 1981, at A31.
151. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 464 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (stating that the proposed project
took private property for private use).
152. Id. at 477 (citing In re Slum Clearance, 50 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 1951); General Dev. Corp. v.
City of Detroit, 33 N.W.2d 919 (Mich. 1948); In re Jeffries Homes Hous. Project, 11 N.W.2d 272
(Mich. 1943); In re Brewster St. Hous. Site, 289 N.W. 493 (Mich. 1939)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 477-78.
155. Id. at 480.
156. Id. at 478 (arguing instead that defendants really claimed that eminent domain was required
for the construction of a new General Motors assembly plant within the city limits of Detroit in order to
comply with the specifications of General Motors).
157. Id. at 479.
158. Id. at 480. Justice Ryan emphasized that General Motors would be accountable to its stock-
holders, and not the public, meaning that employment would be determined primarily with reference
not to the rate of regional unemployment, but to profit. Id. "Who knows what the automotive industry
will look like in 20 years, or even [10]? For that matter, who knows what cars will look like then? For
all that can he known now, in light of present trends, the plant could he fully automated in 10 years."
Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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down by General Motors, which the dissent stated were of private, not
public, significance. 159
Despite the dissent's vigorous arguments, public use was primarily
regarded by the court as public benefit, whether it be direct or in-
direct. 160 The dissent was correct, however, in stating that the Poletown
decision would have an incredible impact on future generations.161
Poletown has generally been regarded as the most crucial authority
regarding the expansive public use doctrine. 162 However, perhaps more
interesting is the fact that the court in Poletown used a somewhat height-
ened scrutiny in reviewing the case. 163
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE PUBLIC USE AND PRIVATE
TAKING
In light of recent private transferee takings throughout the nation, it
is no surprise that the trend within the law is to sanction broad legislative
discretion to use eminent domain for a variety of economic purposes. 164
Nonetheless, state courts still have applied somewhat different standards
of review with regard to the transfer of property to a private interest.165
The standard of review generally involves one of two types: an indepen-
dent analysis of the public benefit to be transferred to society, or a
deferential, minimal review of the public use determination.166 The
independent analysis or heightened scrutiny is less likely to be applied
today, while the minimal or deferential standard of review is more widely
exercised.167
159. Id. (arguing that the conditions laid down by General Motors were designed to further its
private interest).
160. Id. at 459 (finding several clear and significant public benefits).
161. Id. at 464 (stating that the economic, sociological, political, and jurisprudential impact of
Poletown would be felt and heard for many generations).
162. Poletown has been cited in 37 cases since its decision was handed down in 1981. See
Westlaw Keycite (304 N.W2d 455), Feb. 25, 1999.
163. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459-60 (announcing a heightened standard of review).
164. See, e.g., Baycol v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 314 So.2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1975) (approving the
use of eminent domain for the purpose of constructing a parking facility in connection with a shopping
mall); City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele 291 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 1980) (approving the condem-
nation of land for construction of a city center resulting in 5,900 new jobs); City of Jamestown v.
Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 367 (N.D. 1996) (finding that economic development is
generally recognized as a valid public use).
165. See, e.g., Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Land with Improvements, 521 A.2d 227, 230-31
(Del. 1986) (finding that the Wilmington Parking Authority acted outside its statutorily limited purpose
of providing for public parking when it held that the purpose of the condemnation was to benefit a
private company and not the city).
166. See supra notes 164-65.
167. See Schultz & Jann, supra note I1, at 387-88 (stating that courts in recent years find the
requirement of public use satisfied so long as the use serves a public benefit or purpose).
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A. THE HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF REVIEW
The heightened standard of review involves an independent analysis
of the evidence, whereby a court determines if the condemnation is to be
used for the alleged public purpose. 168 Courts often apply this higher
standard when the condemnation is for a public use that is exercised in
such a way to benefit a private interest.169, A strict scrutiny application
will place the burden of proof on the challenger of the condemnation. 170
However, courts generally presume that the taking is for a public use,
and the independent analysis is intended to investigate the predominant
purpose of the proposed taking.171
1. Burden of Proof
If an owner of private, condemned property challenges the constitu-
tionality of a taking, the burden of proving that the taking is not for a
public purpose falls on the property owner. 172 Such a burden is difficult
to sustain, because condemnation of private property for a public use
cannot be prohibited simply because a private interest enjoys incidental
private gains. 173 The challenger must show more than private gain; the
challenger must establish that the power of eminent domain was used for
the primary benefit of the private interest. 174
2. A Presumption of Public Use
Despite the application of a heightened standard of review, there is
still a presumption that a use is public when the legislature has declared it
to be.175 Courts at this point have a limited role, because they must only
determine that the power of eminent domain was exercised pursuant to
168. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459 (finding that the power of eminent domain is to be used
for the essential public purposes of minimizing unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of
the community).
169. See id. at 459-50.
170. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[12].
171. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[11][b]; see also Merill, supra note 2, at 67.
172. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[12].
173. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 458.
174. See id. at 450-59. In Poletown, the court found that condemnation was primarily for a
public purpose, and not a private purpose, despite the fact that the General Motors Corporation stood
to profit a great deal. Id. at 458. The challengers were unable to demonstrate a private purpose
because of the substantial benefits bestowed upon the city in light of Detroit's severe economic
conditions. Id. Michigan had an unemployment rate of 14.2%, while Detroit's unemployment rates
were as high as 18%. Id. at 465. Among African-American citizens, however, the unemployment
rate was nearly 30%. Id.
175. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[1 1][b].
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statutory authority and that the authority was connected to a valid public
purpose. 176 If, however, after giving due respect to the declaration of the
legislature, a court considers the purpose to be unreasonable and uncon-
nected to a public purpose, then it may declare the use unconstitu-
tional.177 Yet, this is unlikely, even in instances in which a court exercis-
es a higher standard of review. 178
For instance, the plaintiffs in Poletown did not challenge the consti-
tutionality of the legislative act.179 Nonetheless, the Michigan Supreme
Court determined that the city was using the power of eminent domain
pursuant to statutory authority.1 80 Thus, although the Poletown plain-
tiffs did challenge the constitutionality of the use of eminent domain for
private appropriation, the court determined that the private transfer of
property to General Motors was in connection with a valid public
purpose. 181
3. Independent Analysis of Public Benefits
It is both difficult and costly for courts to complete an independent
analysis of a societal or public benefit. 18 2 It is difficult because deter-
mining the societal costs and benefits of any taking is at best uncertain
and speculative. '8 3 It is costly because it requires courts to review all of
the evidence presented and determine if, in fact, the taking is in the
interests of the public.184
Courts will frequently look to extrinsic facts to investigate the actual
business the eminent domain seeks to benefit and will determine how
essential the business is to the city.'S5 Subsequently, after the use has
been declared public, courts will generally refuse to examine ulterior
motives for the use of eminent domain.' 8 6 This aggressive independent
176. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[1 1][b].
177. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[1 1][b].
178. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459-60. The court stated that it was using a heightened
standard of review, but it still found that heightened standard of review, despite the condemnation for
an automobile assembly plant served a public purpose. Id.
179. Id. at 458 (stating that appellants did not challenge the legislative declaration that programs
to prevent conditions of unemployment and to develop industry and commerce are essential public
purposes).
180. See supra note 45 (citing the Michigan Economic Corporations Act § 125.1602).
181. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 458-59 (finding that alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the
economic base of the community were essential public purposes).
182. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 73 (discussing the problems of the cost-benefit analysis).
183. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 73.
184. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 73 (speculating that courts may not always be best suited to
make public use determinations).
185. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[1 l][b].
186. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[l l][b].
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analysis is the unique factor which characterizes the heightened standard
of review.187
For instance, in Poletown, the city presented evidence of public
benefits that would allegedly be offered by the General Motors Plant: a
revitalization of local industries, the creation of 6,150 jobs,188 and an
increase in tax revenue.189 Such evidence was substantial enough to
satisfy the majority of the Michigan Supreme Court that a benefit to the
city of Detroit existed. 190
Following this analysis, the court determined how essential the
particular business was to the city, noting that the automobile industry
had historically been an essential industry for Detroit. 191 The Poletown
court did not explore the fact that General Motors, not the city, initiated
the construction project.192 Since the use had been declared public by
the court, the fact that General Motors solicited the city for its aid in
locating a factory site was irrelevant. 193
Thus, the private owner's burden of proving that a taking is not for
a public purpose is particularly challenging.194 However, the heightened
scrutiny is still important, because the question of public use is ultimately
a judicial one. 195 The decision in In re City of Seattle196 represents a
rare, hostile form of judicial review accorded to a private transferee
taking.197 In City of Seattle, landowners brought action against the city
of Seattle for the condemnation of their property for a municipal
improvement project.198 The Westlake improvement project included a
public park, a public parking garage, an art museum, and privately
owned retail space.199 The purpose of the improvement project was both
187. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459-60
(Mich. 1981) (stating that when condemnation is exercised in a way that benefits private interest, a
heightened scrutiny will be applied to the claim that the public interest is the predominant interest being
advanced).
188. See id. at464n.15.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 459.
191. Id. (stating that the automobile industry is the city of Detroit's economic lifeblood). In addi-
tion to General Motors, the Chrysler Corporation, the American Motors Corporation, and the Ford
Motor Company all operate automobile plants within the city of Detroit. Id. at 465.
192. Id. at 464 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (stating that it was not the governmental unit which had selected the site in question for
commercial development).
194. See Schultz & Jann, supra note 11, at 387-88 (stating that in recent years nearly any acquisi-
tion meets the public use test if it serves a public interest).
195. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, §7.03[11 [la].
196. 638 P.2d 549 (Wash. 1981).
197. See Ross, supra note 18, at 362.
198. See In re City of Seattle, 638 P.2d 549, 551 (Wash. 1981).
199. See id. at 553. The architectural plans for the project showed a triangular public park of ap-
proximately 25,000 square feet; public open spaces, including covered arcades, sidewalks, plazas, a
rooftop garden and courtyard, and a rooftop terrace; a public parking garage which included short-
term parking space; a monorail terminal approximately 4,600 square feet accessible to the public; an
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
to forestall the decay experienced by the retail cores of other cities and
to create aesthetically satisfying public space.200 Under the deferential
societal-benefit standard of review, the taking would have been approved
because of the substantial benefits to the city.2 01 However, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court struck down the proposed project as unconstitutional
because a portion of the land to be acquired through eminent domain
was to be rented or sold for private use.202 The court stated that a project
did not constitute a public use when only a portion of the acquired
property would truly be devoted to public uses, with the remainder of it
sold for private use.203
The City of Seattle court conceded that the improvement project was
in the best interests of the city, but the court stated also that the use was
not truly a public interest. 204 The question whether the improvement
project was really a public use was for the court to determine without
regard to any legislative assertion. 205 The court clearly announced that
eminent domain cannot be invoked when a private use is so closely
combined with a public use that the two could not be separated. 206 The
City of Seattle decision is an example of a strict scrutiny standard seldom
applied to a private transferee taking.2 07
By using heightened scrutiny, courts remain able to inquire as to the
actual use of a condemnation, because that use must be public before
private property may be taken by eminent domain. 208 The underlying
rationale for such strict scrutiny likely lies in the characterization of
private transferee takings as both undesirable and as threatening to
precedent.2 09 Nonetheless, most state courts currently favor a deferential
standard of review with regard to a private transfer taking. 210
art museum in the new structure devoted to galleries, children's museum shop library, and admini-
strative and support functions; retail and cinema space occupying four floors of the new building; and
interior circulation systems of approximately 45,000 square feet. Id.
200. See id. at 552.
201. See Ross, supra note 18, at 363 (discussing the hostile judicial review in City of Seattle).
202. See City of Seattle, 638 P.2d at 556.
203. See id. (finding that the retail shops were a substantial element of the project that were
essential to its functioning).
204. See id.
205. See id. (stating that cases from other jurisdictions holding that a legislative pronouncement
of a public use controls were not helpful).
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 369 (N.D. 1996).
209. See Ross, supra note 18, at 363.
210. See supra note 166 (citing cases in which the power of eminent domain was exercised for
the use of economic development).
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B. MINIMAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
Since the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Berman, courts generally
have the authority to defer to the legislature. 2 11 Therefore, the question
often presented to courts in public use determinations is not whether the
use for which the property is being taken is public, but rather, whether
the legislature might reasonably consider it to be public.2 12 Berman's
minimal standard of review permits courts to uphold a private transferee
taking for nearly any acquisition which broadly or incidentally serves a
public purpose. 213
Courts exercising this minimal standard of review place the burden
of proof on the challenger, as do courts exercising a heightened standard
of review.214 The presumption of a public use is analyzed as well in both
standards of review. 2 15 The difference between the two standards, how-
ever, lies in the minimal standard's absence of an independent analysis
of a use's purported societal benefit.2 16 Thus, courts applying a deferen-
tial standard of review will not look to extrinsic facts to determine if the
proposed use of the condemned property is in fact for a public use.2 17
In City of Duluth v. State,218 Duluth sought to condemn property
for the construction of a papermill. 219 The papermill's purpose was to
provide permanent and temporary employment in an economically dis-
tressed area.220 The standard by which the court reviewed the case was
extremely deferential. 221 The court recognized its limited role in review-
ing condemnation determinations, stating that great importance would be
211. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (stating that the judicial role in determining a
public purpose is an extremely narrow one).
212. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[11 ][a].
213. See Schultz & Jann, supra note II, at 387-88 (discussing the expanded modem use of
eminent domain).
214. See generally supra notes 164-65 (citing cases both approving and disapproving the use of
eminent domain for economic development).
215. See supra notes 164-65.
216. See generally Berman, 348 U.S. at 26 (applying a deferential standard of review).
217. See, e.g., Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Land with Improvements, 521 A.2d 227, 230-31 (Del.
1986) (finding that the Wilmington Parking Authority acted outside of its statutorily limited purpose of
providing for public parking when it held that the purpose of condemnation was to benefit a private
company not the city).
218. 390 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1986).
219. City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Minn. 1986). The 72-acre site included
homes, small businesses, and approximately 18 acres of appellant's land. Id. A portion of the
appellant's property was vacant, but in the northeast corner of the site stood a building used for
Oriental food processing until the mid 1970s. Id. At the time of the condemnation, the building was
mostly unused although two businesses, a tire-capping company and Grandma's, Inc., were renting
space. Id. However, appellants indicated that they were planning a reopening of the plant which
processed Oriental foods. Id.
220. Id. at 762.
221. Id.
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given to the determination of the condemning authority. 222 Therefore,
the only evidence the court evaluated was that provided in the record.223
The City of Duluth court noted that if it appeared that the record con-
tained some evidence of public use, no matter how informal, there would
be nothing left for the court to decide.224 Thus, the court was extremely
deferential, relying solely on the trial court's findings. 225
This minimal standard of review makes it impractical to challenge a
public use taking as unconstitutional.2 26 Since it is likely that any eco-
nomic development will produce benefits to a society at large, courts will
nearly always approve a private transferee taking. 227 The deferential
standard illustrates just how limited the judicial role is with regard to
eminent domain determinations. 228
Likewise, many courts indicate that when a legislature has spoken, it
has declared the public interest in terms that are conclusive. 229 The
result of this statement is also narrow.230 All a state legislature must do is
enact a statute that declares economic development to be a public bene-
fit.231 Thereafter, the only limitation is specific state constitutions, which
generally provide that the condemnation must only satisfy a public use,
meaning the use cannot be for the benefit of a private interest.232
The minimal standard of review applied to the public use doctrine is
viewed by many commentators as somewhat of a rubber stamp on all
private transfer takings. 233 As economic development continues to thrive
throughout the nation, the minimal scrutiny is likely to be the favorable
approach taken by courts.
State courts generally apply two different standards of review with
respect to the transfer of property to a private interest: the heightened
222. Id.
223. Id. (complying with Rule 52 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reviewed
only the documentary findings).
224. Id. at 763 (quoting Housing & Redevelopment Auth. v. Minneapolis Metro. Co., 104 N.W.2d
864, 874 (Minn. 1960)).
225. Id. at 763. "Judicial deference to a legislative determination that land being condemned is
for a public use is the court noted, required until it is shown to involve an impossibility." Id. (quoting
Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1965)).
226. Id. at 760 (holding that the condemned property was for a public use).
227. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464 (Mich. 1981)
(Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
228. See id.
229. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (stating that the legislature is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, whether it be Congress or the state
legislating).
230. See id.
231. See supra note 45 (quoting Michigan Economic Development Corporations Act, MICH. CoMP.
LAWS ANN. § 125.1602 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999)).
232. See supra note 78 (listing state constitutional authority for eminent domain).




standard of review and the minimal standard of review. 234 The height-
ened standard of review has in recent years tended to yield to the emi-
nent domain exercising authority.235 Whatever the standard of review
applied, however, recent decisions indicate that courts are willing to
tolerate expansive definitions of public use.236
V. NORTH DAKOTA'S TREATMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE
DOCTRINE
Under the North Dakota Constitution, a use must be deemed public
before private property may be taken under the power of eminent
domain.237 This constitutional limitation has historically been applied in
a traditional manner.238 Typically, this included only roads, sewers, and
railroads. 239 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court has recently
upheld the use of eminent domain for economic development. 240
In City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc.,241 the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that stimulation of economic growth and
removal of economic stagnation do meet the public use requirements of
the North Dakota Constitution. 242 The importance of this case lies in its
unique circumstances: Property was condemned and taken from one
retail business under a public use statute for the benefit of another retail
business in direct competition with the benefited business. 243
The city of Jamestown proposed use of its eminent domain authori-
ty to condemn appellants' private property in order to provide for the
construction of a retail food store.244 The disputed property was located
234. See supra notes 164-65.
235. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459-60
(Mich. 1981) (announcing a heightened standard of review while holding that the construction project
was a public benefit).
236. See Schultz & Jann, supra note 11, at 387 (stating that the definition of public use has
expanded broadly so that any acquisition meets the public use test).
237. N.D. CoNsT. art I, § 16.
238. See, e.g., Mougey Farms v. Kaspari, 1998 N.D. 118, 32, 579 N.W.2d 583, 590 (holding
that farmland irrigation is analogous to the best interests of the people, making it a public use); City of
Medora v. Golberg, 1997 N.D. 190, 111, 569 N.W.2d 257, 260 (holding that easements for a public
railroad and for utilities, water, sewer, and cable television satisfy a public use); Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Kreszeszewski, 115 N.W. 679, 679 (N.D. 1908) (holding that property necessary for the
construction of a railroad was a public use).
239. See supra note 238.
240. See City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 369 (N.D. 1996)
(stating that economic development has generally been identified as a valid public use) (citations
omitted).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 369. "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation having first been made to, or paid into court for the owner, unless the owner chooses to
accept annual payments as may be provided by law." N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
243. See Leevers Supermarkets, 552 N.W.2d at 367-68 (stating the facts of the case).
244. Id.
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in the middle of the proposed two-square block development area. 245 At
the time the property was designated for commercial development,
appellants owned the only two full-service grocery stores in the city of
Jamestown. 246 At issue was whether the condemnation of appellants'
property for the construction of a grocery store, which would be in
direct competition with their existing grocery stores, was for a valid
public use under the North Dakota Constitution. 247
The eminent domain authority was exercised pursuant to North
Dakota's Urban Renewal Law, 248 a statute similar to the statute used in
Poletown.249 The Urban Renewal Law provides municipalities with the
authority to act in furtherance of economic development as they deem
necessary to eliminate unemployment, underemployment, and jobless-
ness. 250 It was this authority which permitted the City of Jamestown to
condemn Leevers Supermarkets' land for the construction of another
grocery store. 251
Despite announcing a narrow standard of review, the Leevers Super-
markets court in fact applied a somewhat heightened scrutiny. 252 The
court examined the societal benefit of the taking, yet it still remained
deferential to the North Dakota legislature. 253 In fact, the court's review
was analogous to the city's judgment, and it determined that the
evidence for the project supported a valid finding of necessity.2 54
245. Id. at 371. Appellants used the property as parking lots. Id. at 367.
246. Id. Prior to the proceedings, appellants agreed on a purchase price for the property, but it
was contingent on there being no tax dollars involved in the development project. Id. at 368. When
the city and appellants could not agree as to this point, the city brought eminent domain proceedings.
Id.
247. Id. at 372.
248. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-58-02 (Supp. 1999).
249. See supra note 45 (quoting the Michigan Economic Development Corporations Act, MICH
COMP. LAWS ANN. §125.1602 (1997 & Supp. 1999)).
250. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-58-02(2)-(3) (Supp. 1999).
(2) It is further found and declared that there exist in municipalities of the state
conditions of unemployment, underemployment, and joblessness detrimental to the
economic growth of the state economy; that it is appropriate to implement economic
development programs both desirable and necessary to eliminate the causes of
unemployment, underemployment, and joblessness for the benefit of the state economy;
and that tax increment financing is an economic development program designed to
facilitate projects that create economic growth and development.
(3) It is further found and declared that the powers conferred by this chapter are for
public uses and purposes for which public money may be expended and the power of
eminent domain exercised; and that the necessity in the public interest for the provisions
herein enacted is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.
Id.
251. Leevers Supermarkets, 552 N.W.2d at 368-69.
252. See id. at 370.
253. Id. (stating that the purported purpose of a taking of private property was subject to a limited
judicial review).
254. Id. at 370.
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The court began its analysis by easily concluding that economic
development was a valid public purpose. 255 The court provided little
discussion on this point, stating only that the trend within modem
legislative and judicial thinking was to broaden the scope of activities
constituting a public purpose.256 Essentially, the court presumed that
economic development was a valid public use because the North Dakota
legislature had declared it to be by enacting the Urban Renewal Law.257
The court then addressed the vast evidence supporting the property
condemnation. 258 The city of Jamestown had maintained the need for
economic development in the downtown area on the grounds that the
downtown area would deteriorate without it.259 Furthermore, it claimed
that a new grocery store in the city of Jamestown would increase the
existing low wage base and increase the number of people working
full-time jobs.260 However, the unemployment rate was not high in
Jamestown, and it had in fact recently fallen. 261 The court was not
concerned, however, because it determined that the taking would result in
substantial benefits for the community at large.262
What is likely disturbing to many about the Leevers Supermarkets
decision is that it approved the city of Jamestown's plan to take property
from one business owner for the benefit of its direct competitor. 263
However, the particular business benefited by a taking was of no rele-
vance to the court; the significance rather lay in the economic develop-
ment resulting from the taking. 264 An investigation as to the reasons
why the authority exercising eminent domain chose a directly competing
grocery store as opposed to, for example, a hardware store would have
constituted a questioning of possible ulterior motives. 265 However, this is
not the job of a court, and it is understood that courts will not intervene
255. Id. at 369.
256. Id. (conceding that economic welfare likely constituted the broadest extent of a public use)
(citation omitted).
257. Id. (quoting 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[l 1][b]).
258. Id. at 370. Evidence at the trial level showed that the disputed property was zoned for
industrial uses, that the property was underutilized, and that the property was necessary for the public
economy in Jamestown. Id.
259. Id. at 371. The development of stores-Buffalo Mall, WalMart, and K-mart-located on the
interstate had drawn business away from the downtown area. Id.
260. Id. At the time of the proposed development, 30% of the population were working multiple
part-time jobs. Id.
261. Id. at 370. There was testimony that showed that the lower rate was not from increased
employment, but rather it was likely from the export of young people moving elsewhere to find
employment opportunities not available in the Jamestown area. Id. at 370-71.
262. Id. at 371. Purported benefits included an increased wage base, a migration of workers into
Jamestown, full-time jobs, and increased business in the downtown area. Id.
263. Id. at 367 (finding that the proposed construction was for a new grocery store).
264. Id. at 370.
265. See 2A NICHOLS. supra note 2, § 7.03[l l][b].
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at this point in the judicial review unless there is evidence to support an
illegal use.2 66
The court in Leevers Supermarkets discussed the Poletown decision
and recognized similarities between the two cases. 267 First, as in
Poletown, the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that it would be
irrelevant that the private interest, the grocery store, would benefit from
the public necessity taking.268 Next, because the legislature gives munici-
palities authority to enact economic programs for the benefit of the com-
munity, the court would employ a limited review.269 Lastly, the property
condemnation would be established as a valid exercise of eminent
domain if the benefit to the municipality was clear and significant. 270
The Leevers Supermarket decision thus makes clear that the North
Dakota Supreme Court endorses the expansive use of eminent domain
for economic development. 271
Finally, the court in Leevers Supermarkets did not rule as to the
primary purpose of the taking.272 The North Dakota Supreme Court
would not rule as to this issue because the trial court made no finding as
to whether the primary object of the project was the economic benefit of
the city of Jamestown or the benefit of the private interest. 273 After
determining that the trial court erroneously failed to address this issue,
the supreme court remanded it back to the trial court to make the
required findings. 274
266. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[ 11][b] (stating that a court as a general rule will not
examine the ulterior motives and undisclosed plans of the taking authority). Appellants were unable to
demonstrate bad faith on the part of the city council. See Leevers Supermarkets, 552 N.W.2d at 371.
However, there was evidence that city officials were not seeking economic development generally
but rather construction of a new grocery store specifically. Id. The mayor testified that he had been
seeking a grocery store for the land in dispute. Id. It was the purpose of the mayor that there be a
new grocery store in Jamestown that would compete with appellant's two existing grocery stores. Id.
The mayor testified that competition would be good because the appellant's grocery stores charged
more for basic items than other communities. Id.
267. Id. at 372-73.
268. Id. at 372. It is certain that eminent domain may not be used to aid private interests to carry
on their business to a better private advantage. Id. (quoting 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[5][a]).
However, even if there is some incidental private benefit to the business, the use for which the land is
taken is one that is public so long as the primary benefit is to the public. Id. (quoting 2A NICHOLS,
supra note 2, § 7.03[5][a]).
269. Id. at 373 (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459
(Mich. 1981)).
270. Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459-60).
271. See generally Leevers Supermarkets, 552 N.W.2d at 372-74 The court recognized a broad
discretion to use eminent domain for a variety of economic development purposes. Id. at 373 (quoting
2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.06[24][c]).
272. Leevers Supermarkets, 552 N.W.2d at 374. For the taking to be valid, the construction
project must be primarily for a public benefit rather than a private purpose. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. A. determination of whether the public use requirement under the state and federal
constitutions has been satisfied cannot be made absent a finding concerning the primary purpose of
the project. Id.
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As illustrated in Leevers Supermarkets, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has recognized that the North Dakota Legislature has provided
municipalities with the tools to encourage economic development in a
variety of ways. 275 Such a broad use will inevitably provide North
Dakota with the authority to redistribute private land within a particular
community to serve the benefit of its citizens. 276 North Dakota has thus
strengthened its position regarding eminent domain leading to far-reach-
ing effects on private property. 277
VI. THE EFFECT OF THE MODERN PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE
The states' modem eminent domain power has been viewed by
some commentators as dangerously expansive, potentially more so than
the power to tax. 278 The exercise of eminent domain affects few parties,
as opposed to a taxing power, which affects entire communities, meaning
eminent domain power is more likely subject to abuse by the authority
exercising it.279 A narrow review of private transferee takings is unlikely
to prevent potential abuses of power, because courts defer to the eminent
domain authority. 280 Therefore, there exists in this area of law a need to
be conscious of both the threat to private property and the possible
motives associated with the private taking so as to eliminate and discour-
age any existing abuses of the eminent domain authority. 281
275. Id. at 369 (stating that economic development is recognized as a valid public purpose).
276. See Schultz & Jann, supra note 11, at 400 (stating that recent rulings endorse the use of
eminent domain for the redistribution of private resources).
277. See generally Leevers Supermarkets, 552 N.W.2d at 365.
The consensus of modem legislative and judicial thinking is to broaden the scope of
activities which may be classed as involving a public purpose.... It reaches perhaps its
broadest extent under the view that economic welfare is one of the main concerns of the
city, state and federal governments.
Id. at 369 (quoting Faulconer v. City of Danville, 232 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ky. 1950)). The court concluded
that the stimulation of economic growth and the removal of economic stagnation sought by chapter
40-58 of the North Dakota Century Code were objectives satisfying the public use and purpose
requirement of the North Dakota Constitution. Id.
278. See Ross, supra note 18, at 369.
279. See Ross, supra note 18, at 369 (arguing that it is more difficult to generate political energy
against an unwarranted taking than it is to generate a political backlash against a tax increase). The
eminent domain power can be used to take citizens' homes and remove the citizens from the political
process. Ross, supra note 18, at 369 n.66 (citing Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981)). Taxation, however, does not have this effect, unless confiscatory.
Ross, supra note 18, at 369.
280. See Ross, supra note 18, at 369.
281. See Ross, supra note 18, at 369-80 (discussing the possible reasons to disfavor a private
transferee taking).
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A. PUBLIC USE AS A THREAT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
In Poletown, the city of Detroit exercised its power of eminent
domain to remove a residential neighborhood, whereby 3,438 people
were removed from their homes to provide for the construction of a new
General Motors assembly plant. 282 A large number of individuals
affected by the project mounted strong opposition to it.283 Nevertheless,
private property was taken in order to promote industry and commerce
to an economically stressed area. 284
The effect of private transferee takings such as Poletown creates an
increased threat to the institution of private property. 285 To concede that
a threat to private property exists does not suggest that such takings are
wrong, 286 but rather that courts may use decisions such as Poletown as
precedent to extend the public use doctrine further.287 The concern sur-
rounding private transferee taking is that the United States Constitution
will no longer provide meaningful barriers to takings by the state. 288
Occasionally, corporations solicit municipalities for aid in acquiring
property for a project site.289 Thus, there exists a threat to private proper-
ty concerning involuntary market exchange. 290 If the corporation is
unable to acquire property through the open market, a city may acquire
the selected land through eminent domain proceedings. 29 1 It is likely
that a city's activities would be upheld by a state court, since the state
legislature has likely declared economic development a valid public use
because of its societal benefits. 292 Such activities may be especially harm-
ful in cities where economic development is continually encouraged
282. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464 (Mich. 1981)
(finding that the dislocation costs as a result of the project were massive).
283. See Anderson, supra note 151, at E47; Safire, supra note 151, at A31.
284. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
285. See Ross, supra note 18, at 370 (stating that private transferee takings such as Poletown may
provide undesirable precedent against which to judge future taking).
286. See Ross, supra note 18, at 378 (asking what remains of the public use limitation after
Poletown).
287. See Ross, supra note 18, at 378.
288. See Ross, supra note 18, at 378.
289. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 464 (finding that it was General Motors who sought the aid of
the city in locating a factory site).
290. See Merrill, supra note 2, at 64 (arguing that eminent domain involves a coerced exchange
of private property).
291. See City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 368 (N.D. 1996)
(finding that it was not until after a purchase agreement had fallen through that eminent domain
proceedings began).
292. See id. at 369.
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despite a good economy. 293 This is so because there is no economically
legitimate reason to take the particular property. 294
However, the court system has the power to change the law of
eminent domain and halt its progression if pressures for private transfer-
ee takings begin to endanger seriously the institution of private prop-
erty.295 Some commentators hope that if the public use doctrine is to be
applied solely in the interest of economics, courts will investigate possi-
ble ulterior motives behind a particular condemnation. 296 As it stands
today, however, courts do not examine ulterior motives due to the
deference given to the authority exercising eminent domain. 297
B. MOTIVATION BEHIND THE PUBLIC USE CONDEMNATION
Some critics fear that private interest takings for economic develop-
ment are likely to be improperly motivated because there exists a benefit
to the private interest. 298 The presence of a private benefit as a result of
a taking will often raise a stricter level of judicial scrutiny. 299 However,
the challenger is not likely to be successful in preventing the taking,
because it is difficult to ascertain motivation as to whether the primary
benefit is for the public interest or the private interest. 3 00  This
determination is so difficult because benefits to the private entity and the
public community generally coexist. 30 1  It is additionally difficult
because the condemnation will not be refused merely on the ground that
there exists an incidental benefit to the private interest. 302 However,
some scholars argue that the private benefit is instrumental because it is
an intentional step in the progression toward public benefits, which may
293. See id. at 369-71 (finding that using eminent domain for economic growth was permissible
even though the unemployment rate was not high).
294. See id.
295. See Ross, supra note 18, at 378 (discussing the effect of the Poletown decision on the
institution of private property).
296. See Ross, supra note 18, at 373. Professor Ross does suggest that the presence of a private
benefit does indicate a desirability of judicial scrutiny of the taking. Ross, supra note 18, at 373.
However, he argues that an improper motivation is just as likely in a private transferee taking as an
ordinary taking, and therefore, the two ought to be subject to the same degree of judicial scrutiny.
Ross, supra note 18, at 372, 381.
297. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2. § 7.031 1][b].
298. See Ross, supra note 18, at 373.
299. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.w.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981)




302. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[5][a].
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include creation of jobs and tax revenues. 303 In short, a private benefit
may be a necessary evil to achieve any public benefits. 304
Since determining motivation is difficult, if not impossible, courts
are hesitant to attempt it.305 The result is the lack of any meaningful
judicial check on the possible reasons for the taking.306 A private taking
is not undesired; rather, it should be encouraged if it is for valid reasons
that effectively advance the interests of the public. 307 Yet, as the law
stands today, improper motivation may be an unfortunate outcome of
the contemporary public use doctrine.308
One proposal for protection against such improper motivation is a
call for a heightened standard of review. 309 Applying this standard of
review, courts would make a good faith inquisition into condemnations
for the benefit of a private interest. 310 If courts in good faith believe that
the private property is being taken for the good of the public, then they
shall find that the public use taking is constitutional under both state and
federal constitutions. 311 However, if courts believe that there is improper
motivation for the taking of the private property, they shall find that the
condemnation is unconstitutional. 312
It may be argued that courts should not examine motivation
because benefits to the public will exist regardless of whether the
condemnation is done in light of an improper motive.313 Yet, permitting
a public use taking regardless of improper motivation seems to run
contrary to the notion of private property, 314 because such property is to
be protected from being taken for private uses. 315 If it is the intention of
the courts to encourage the use of eminent domain for uses that are
303. See Ross, supra note 18, at 373 (comparing the taking of land for a private interest to the
taking of land for a public park).
304. See Ross, supra note 18, at 373.
305. See 2A. NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[1 1][b].
306. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 264-82 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (stating that the fundamental
interest for the construction of the assembly plant was the corporation's interest in profit making).
307. See Ross, supra note 18, at 373. Improper motivation, as it is referred to here, may include
the taking of property for the benefit of a favored citizen or the taking of property as a desire to hurt a
disfavored citizen. Ross, supra note 18, at 370-71.
308. Ross, supra note 18, at 373.
309. Ross, supra note 18, at 373.
310. Ross, supra note 18, at 373.
311. Ross, supra note 18, at 373.
312. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 7.03[1 1][c] (stating that some courts have found a condem-
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certainly public, then the contemporary public use doctrine must be
construed strictly.316
VII. CONCLUSION
The effect of the contemporary public use doctrine has moved the
law of eminent domain into uncertain territory. 317 However, it was the
purpose of the state and federal constitutions to provide for the dramatic
changes concerning societal needs and necessities associated with the
public. 318 The Poletown decision illustrates best the progression of the
modem public use doctrine, for today it has expanded to meet nearly
any acquisition which meets the test of serving a public purpose, confer-
ring a benefit on the public, or furthering the state's police powers. 319
North Dakota has patterned much of its recent movements within the law
of eminent domain after Poletown, such that it too provides authority for
the use of eminent domain for economic development. 320
To clarify, condemnation for a private interest is not wrong. 321
Certainly there are instances in which private property must be taken for
the benefit of the public to stimulate the community's economy or
provide employment to a large number of people. 322 Furthermore, the
use of contemporary eminent domain seeks to redistribute the wealth
among an entire community. 323 Since cities will continue to use the
power of eminent domain for economic growth and development, it is
crucial that courts make a more meaningful examination as to the nature
of the proposed condemnation. 324
Jennifer Maude Klemetsrud
316. See Ross, supra note 18, at 374 (stating that improper motivation may suggest the need for
strong judicial review).
317. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich.
1981) (stating that a public use varies with changing conditions within a society).
318. See Melton, supra note 20, at 12 (stating that the eminent domain doctrine today is consistent
with the original American concept that public use meant public benefit of nearly any conceivable
kind).
319. See Schultz & Jann, supra note 11, at 387-88.
320. See, e.g., City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 369 (N.D.
1996) (discussing the Poletown decision at length).
321. See Ross, supra note 18, at 381 (stating that private transferee takings are not per se
improper).
322. See Schultz & Jann, supra note 11, at 400 (arguing that decisions such as Poletown endorse
the use of eminent domain for the purpose of redistributing private resources within society to
accomplish public purposes).
323. See Schultz & Jann, supra note 11, at 400.
324. See 2A NICHOLS, supra note 2, § 708[2].
NOTE 813

